香港六合彩

Afghanistan has been nicknamed the 鈥済raveyard of empires鈥� in reference to the failure of colonial attempts to govern it. Yet this often distracts from the sombre fact that anyone 鈥� whether insiders or outsiders 鈥� who has tried to establish control over the whole country has met with resistance. The speed at which the US-backed government was听recently removed听seems to speak to this perennial ungovernability. This is what the country鈥檚 new dominant force, the Taliban, are beginning to rediscover.

If the country made any progress towards institution building in the two decades following the ousting of the Taliban in 2001, it was only with considerable international help, financially, administratively and militarily. But these efforts suffered from deep flaws, some of them structural.

For instance, the political system established by听2001 Bonn Agreement听was听quasi-monarchical, giving too much power to the president. Its highly centralised hierarchy easily disintegrated after the recent fall of the capital, Kabul.

Power centralisation was worsened by President Ashraf Ghani鈥檚 tendency to concentrate authority in the presidential palace. This led many disgruntled Afghans to deride Ghani鈥檚 government as a 鈥渢hree-man republic鈥� 鈥� alluding to the role by him and his two influential associates, his national security adviser,听Hamdullah Mohib, and chief of staff,听Fazel Mahmood Fazli.

In the wake of Taliban鈥檚 takeover, there were hopes that some state capacities could be sustained if the new administration was inclusive and outward-looking enough to court international recognition and assistance. But the caretaker cabinet, announced on September 8, showed these hopes were in vain. Many in the听cabinet, including its prime minister and interior minister, are on international sanctions lists.

With humanitarian aid听fast depleting, Afghanistan faces the urgent threat of hunger and serious disruption of most economic activities, according to UN听estimates.

Voices听inside听and听outside听the Taliban have been calling for foreign assistance. But international funds managing aid expenditure in the past 20 years 鈥� led by the World Bank, United Nations Development Program, Nato and the Asian Development Bank 鈥� have now been dismantled, and direct engagement with the Taliban by former donors appears unlikely.

Some assistance has been provided by the UN, as well as听Pakistan听and听China. But this pales in comparison to what the western-backed Afghan governments听received.

Before the Taliban takover, Afghanistan鈥檚 fiscal and monetary policy required close technical cooperation by the World Bank and IMF, which have听suspended听operations, citing uncertainty over how their various programmes would be able to continue.

This cooperation was central to the post-2001 governance system. It may have entailed technical dependencies that handicapped Afghanistan鈥檚 development, but it ensured relatively centralised state fiscal and monetary management. This is unlikely to be restored without another outside source of help.

The technocratic deficit has been made worse because of the number of educated people who have fled the country or gone into hiding because of a听fear of reprisals听from Taliban militants.

Also of concern is the future of the currency. The Afghani is pegged to the US dollar and faces听looming depreciation听owing to shortages of currency reserves and a lack of skilled monetary management following the Taliban takeover. The US government听has frozen access to听Afghanistan central bank鈥檚 reserves, held in the Federal Reserve in New York.

This, coupled with a huge trade deficit that is likely to now worsen given the serious disruption of previous limited productive activity, means that importing vital goods will further drain its reserves. This will cripple the economy unless a benefactor state (Qatar, Pakistan or potentially China) comes to the Taliban鈥檚 support.

During the first Taliban regime, the Pakistani rupee and Iranian Rial were in wide use as alternative currencies for importing from those countries 鈥� the source of most of Afghanistan鈥檚 imports. Pakistan鈥檚 finance minister, Shaukat Tarin听suggested听the same might happen this time when it comes to bilateral trade. The future of the Afghani itself is uncertain, given that Afghani banknotes are printed in Germany, which is yet to recognise the Taliban administration.

Meanwhile, especially while the Taliban are struggling for international recognition, foreign policy will be heavily influenced by Pakistan. During the first Taliban regime, most international organisations working with Afghanistan relocated to Pakistan. Qatar, given its role in听facilitating US-Taliban negotiations, has been vying with Pakistan for influence in Afghanistan, but Pakistan鈥檚 role in Afghan foreign policy runs deep, aided by geographic proximity.

Confusion due to lack of governance might propel the Taliban to return to methods that characterised their bitterly unpopular first regime. There is听evidence听that some of the brutal and oppressive measures are returning, which is likely to alienate an already frustrated population.

The country has changed in 20 years of western-backed government. The population is听younger听鈥� and women, in particular, have enjoyed a great deal more control over their own lives. Despite a Taliban ban, there have been听protests across the country听by womens鈥� rights and democracy advocates. Repressive measures can only do so much to subdue a defiant public.

Militarily, the Taliban鈥檚 early sense of triumph might prove premature. Armed resistance by the pro-democracy National Resistance Front (NRF)听continues, and violent terror attacks by the听Islamic State of Khurasan (ISIS-K), which belittles the Taliban as too soft and 鈥渘ationalistic鈥�, are on the rise.

The obvious solution would have been to foster the idea of an inclusive republic. This could help to attract the thousands of educated workers needed for technical jobs who have fled or are in hiding. Providing the sort of liberties that have proven popular among most Afghans would be a sign of good faith too.

This could risk the loyalty of the Taliban鈥檚 most extreme elements, but its advantages could outweigh downsides. Most importantly, it could rally NRF鈥檚 support if its fundamental demands, including some form of electoral politics, were guaranteed. Sadly, the Taliban have so far shown they do not prefer this path.

This article first appeared in on 21st September 2021.

Links

• Original article in
• Kambaiz Rafi鈥檚 research profile
• 香港六合彩 Bartlett Development Planning Unit
• 香港六合彩 Faculty of the Built Environment