

Examining livelihoods impacts of WMAs

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What do WMAs do?




A word on method

App. 2,000 HHs Stratified random sampling Elites (10) Very poor (10) Others (20) Questionnaire ODK






ATET estimate land ownership



A control example



Perceived change in wildlife crop damage 2007 - 2014



WMA revenues

WMA	Revenues
VVIVIA	Revenues
Burunge	Annual revenue for each village increased from around USD 1,660 in 2007 to around <u>USD 19,100</u> in 2015.
Enduimet	Annual revenue for each village increased from around USD 1,200 in 2008 to around $\underline{\text{USD 8,250}}$ in 2015.
Makame	First revenues for Makame WMA came in at the end of 2013 and amounted to 15,000 USD
Liwale	In 2013 and 2014 around <u>USD 1,000</u> were distributed to each village by the District.
Mbarangandu	Donor contributions to WMA villages from a hunting outfitter and a mining company amounted to USD 28,000 in 2012 and USD 33,000 in 2015. Mbarang andu villages received around <u>USD 1,000</u> annually from the AA in the last three years
Tunduru-Nalika	Tunduru-Nalika villages received around <u>USD 250</u> annually from the AA in the last three years

WMA revenues

Policy recommendations

GoT could forfeit its share of the revenues to favor villages by, for instance, doing away with the 35% tax on non-consumptive tourism revenues $\,$

revenues
At WMA level the sharing of revenues could be changed to favor villages that bear the brunt of the costs and/or villages that do not contribute important corridor functions could be excluded
WMA management plans and land use regulations should respect local livelihoods needs, including allowing non-extractive uses such as grazing in northern Tanzanian pastoralist areas and beekeeping in southern Tanzanian forested areas
GoT could support AAs in rule enforcement against political and economic elites, such as tourism operators